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Understanding the relation between attention and consciousness is an important part of
our understanding of consciousness. Attention, unlike consciousness, can be systemati-
cally manipulated in psychophysical experiments and a law-like relation between attention
and consciousness is waiting to be discovered. Most attempts to discover the nature of
this relation are focused on a special type of attention: spatial visual attention. In this review
I want to introduce another type of attention to the discussion: attention to the olfactory
modality. I will ﬁrst clarify the position of attention to smells in a general taxonomy of atten-
tion. I will then review the mechanisms and neuroanatomy of attention and consciousness
in the olfactory system before using the newly introduced system to provide evidence that
attention is necessary for consciousness.
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INTRODUCTION
Knowledge about the relation between attention and conscious-
ness is invaluable for the empirical study of consciousness because
attention can be varied experimentally and its effect on conscious
perception can be measured. The discussion of how attention
relates to consciousness has so far been based primarily on empir-
ical results from the study of spatial visual attention (Dehaene
et al., 2006; De Brigard and Prinz, 2010; Prinz, 2010; Van Box-
tel et al., 2010). The goal of this paper is to introduce attentional
shifts toward the olfactory modality as a second system in which
attention and consciousness interact. The advantage of opening
up the discussion to facts from a second type of attention is that it
reduces the likelihood of mistaking special adaptations for general
principles.
The main motivation to study attention in olfaction is the
computational and anatomical simplicity of the olfactory system
(Haberly, 2001; Lledo et al., 2005; Isaacson, 2010; Sela and Sobel,
2010). The study of simple systems to reveal general principles has
contributed signiﬁcantly to our understanding of many biologi-
cal processes and the olfactory system is an ideal model system
for consciousness research. It may even represent the minimal
neuroanatomy that is required for conscious processing (Morsella
et al., 2010).
Toward the goal of introducing attentional shifts toward olfac-
tion as a system for the study of attention, this paper has three aims.
The ﬁrst aim is to develop a taxonomy of olfactory attention that is
integrated into a general taxonomyof attention (Chun et al., 2011).
The second aim is to review what is known about the brain struc-
tures that are involved in attentional shifts toward the olfactory
modality and in the conscious processing of olfactory informa-
tion. These ﬁrst two parts together introduce a system in which
questions about the relation between attention and consciousness
can be studied. The third aim is to demonstrate the utility of the
newly introduced system by answering one of these questions:
is attention to smells necessary for the conscious processing of
smells?
A TAXONOMY OF OLFACTORY ATTENTION
The study of attention in the olfactory modality is in its infancy.
A search of literature databases will reveal that there are almost a
thousand times more papers on visual attention than on olfactory
attention. Before discussing attention in the olfactory modality it
is therefore necessary to clarify what types of olfactory attention
there are and how they relate to other types of attention. I will
accomplish this by placing olfactory attentional processes into a
recently introduced general taxonomy of attention (Chun et al.,
2011).
The taxonomy proposed by Chun et al. (2011) is based on
what type of information attention operates over. The most basic
distinction is between external and internal attention. Internal
attention operates over internally generated information such as
memories, thoughts, or task rules. External attention operates over
sensory information. The types of olfactory attention discussed in
this paper are types of external attention. External attention can
be further subdivided into attention to space, time, objects, or
features of objects. In addition, there is attention to information
generated by a speciﬁc modality. I will now discuss these ﬁve types
of external attention (spatial attention, temporal attention, atten-
tion to objects, attention to features, and attention to a modality)
in olfaction.
SPATIAL OLFACTORY ATTENTION
Theparadigmatic case of spatial attention is the allocation of visual
attention to positions in visual space. Visual spatial attention can
be shifted overtly by body, head, and eye movements or covertly
by computational means while the ﬁxation point is unchanged.
In every-day experience overt shifts of spatial visual attention
are more prominent but covert shifts are also signiﬁcant (for
example,Wojciulik et al., 1998). Other senses with spatially struc-
tured phenomenology, like passive touch, also have computational
mechanisms for covert spatial attention (Forster and Eimer, 2004).
Overt spatial shifts of attention are possible in olfaction. In
the same way in which visual attention can be shifted in space by
www.frontiersin.org December 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 380 | 1
Keller Olfactory consciousness and attention
turning the head, olfactory attention can be shifted in space by
placing the nose over different objects that are giving off odors.
These overt shifts of olfactory spatial attention allow us to locate
sources of odors and to track scents (Porter et al., 2006). The study
of overt shifts of spatial attention to elucidate the relation between
attention and consciousness is complicated by the fact that overtly
shifting olfactory or visual attention changes the sensory input.
Covert shifts, in which the sensory input remains the same and the
only difference is how attention is distributed over the visual ﬁeld,
have been more informative for questions about consciousness
and attention.
However, covert spatial shifts of attention are only possible in
modalities in which the sensory experience has a spatial structure.
Odor experiences are one example of spatially unstructured sen-
sory experiences (Radil and Wysocki, 1998; Frasnelli et al., 2008).
Some researchers have suggested that an olfactory experience has
a very simple spatial structure that consists of two locations: left
(nostril) and right (nostril; Porter et al., 2005, 2006). Even if this
is the spatial structure of an olfactory experience, there is no evi-
dence that attention can be shifted between the nostrils. There is
therefore no evidence for covert spatial olfactory attention.
TEMPORAL OLFACTORY ATTENTION
It has been shown that in vision attention can not only be allocated
over space but also over time (Coull and Nobre, 1998). This type
of attention can be tested in experiments which involve a cue that
informs the subject at what time after the cue a stimulus can be
expected. The subject will then allocate attention toward the time
window in which the stimulus is expected. Allocating attention
temporally is also possible in olfaction. It is, for example, possible
to pay attention to odors only onWednesdays, but not on the other
days of the week. However, olfactory experiences have a peculiar
temporal structure which makes the fast attentional shifts that are
characteristic of temporal visual attention impossible.
Visual stimuli are normally experienced as long, uninterrupted
stretches of experience. In contrast, olfactory experience is tem-
porally discontinuous. It consists of short, discreet, temporally
unstructured,olfactory experiences every 1.6 s (Laing, 1983;Main-
land and Sobel, 2006). The reason for the interruptions in olfactory
experiences is that the access of odorant molecules to the sensory
neurons in the nose is controlled by sniffs. Snifﬁng is a complex
behavior and the odor-induced brain responses are coupled to
the rhythm of the sniffs (Kepecs et al., 2006). Modulating the
snifﬁng behavior dramatically changes olfactory experiences (Ver-
hagen et al., 2007). It is easy to temporally interrupt an unpleasant
olfactory experience by not inhaling and in normal snifﬁng this
interruption occurs every 1.6 s. As a consequence, changes over
time that occur in less than a second are not part of olfactory
experiences.
Many studies of temporal visual attention involve rapid (sev-
eral per second) serial visual presentations. The most prominent
phenomenon of visual temporal attention is the attentional blink.
The attentional blink is the phenomenon that salient visual stim-
uli are often not consciously detected when they are presented (at
the same spatial location) between 200 and 500ms after another
stimulus (Raymond et al., 1992). In olfaction there is no analog
to the attentional blink. The olfactory experience during a sniff is
temporally unstructured. The experience in one sniff can be inﬂu-
enced by the previous sniff, but these inﬂuences are generally not
considered to be an olfactory version of the attentional blink but
rather effects of habituation or adaptation.
In summary, attention toward smells can be temporally struc-
tured. One can allocate attention toward smells during lunchtime
but not for the rest of the day. However, olfaction is a “slower”
sense than vision. Photons are faster than the odor molecules
diffusing through the olfactory mucus that covers the olfactory
sensory neurons in the nose. As a consequence many phenomena
of fast temporal attention shifts that are studied in vision have no
equivalent in olfaction.
ATTENTION TO OLFACTORY OBJECTS
Several different notions of “olfactory objects” have been intro-
duced but none of them has become widely accepted. Olfactory
objects could be clouds of molecules (Lycan, 2000). Alternatively,
it has been suggested that “olfactory sources (objects that produce
odors, such as a lion) and olfactory events (odors that emanate
from objects, such as a musky lion smell) can be thought of as
olfactory objects” (Gottfried, 2010). A third notion has been intro-
duced by Yeshurun and Sobel (2010) who propose that the odor
object is the pleasantness of an odor.
The relevant question for the possibility of attention to olfac-
tory objects is if more than a single odor object can be experienced
at the same time. If every odor experience consists of a single
object, there is nothing for olfactory object-based attention to
operate over. The different notions of “olfactory object” lead to
different answers to this question. An analogy to vision, where
visual objects cannot occupy the same location in visual space
at the same time, would suggest that because there is only one
location in olfactory space, only one olfactory object can be expe-
rienced at any given time. Nevertheless, some researches argue that
there can be several olfactory objects simultaneously and that an
olfactory object can be separated from an olfactory background
(Stevenson and Wilson, 2007).
Because there is no acceptednotionof“olfactory object”the dis-
agreement over the possibility of simultaneous olfactory objects
and therefore the existence of potential targets for object-based
olfactory attention is merely a verbal dispute. I will adopt a
notion of “olfactory object” in analogy to the notion of “visual
object” according to which an olfactory experience consists of
a single olfactory object at any time. There can therefore be no
object-based olfactory attention. At any time during an olfactory
experience there is only a single olfactory object present. There are
no simultaneous objects betweenwhich attention could be shifted.
ATTENTION TO FEATURES OF OLFACTORY OBJECTS
In vision research, the term “feature-based attention” is used to
describe two similar types of attention (Carrasco, 2011). The ﬁrst
type of attention is when attention is allocated toward one fea-
ture of a visual object, for example color, shape, or orientation, at
the expense of other features (Liu, 2003). A second way in which
“feature-based attention” is used is to describe attention toward
part of the quality space of one feature (Muller, 2006). This is
the attentional strategy used in guided search; for example when
an object of known color is searched for among other objects. If
Frontiers in Psychology | Consciousness Research December 2011 | Volume 2 | Article 380 | 2
Keller Olfactory consciousness and attention
an orange book is searched for on a book shelf, then attention
is shifted toward the area of the color quality space surrounding
orange and away from all the blue, black, and green books.
Olfactory objects only have a single feature, their smell. There
are therefore no features between which olfactory attention could
be shifted. Attending to the olfactory modality is attending to the
single feature of the single olfactory object that is present at that
time. The ﬁrst type of feature-based attention, attention toward
one but not the other features of an object, is therefore not pos-
sible in olfaction. However, attention can be selectively allocated
to certain smell qualities just as it can be allocated toward certain
color qualities.When smelling the complex odor of a glass of wine
we seem to be able to attend either to the fruity qualities of the
smell or to the woody qualities.
In this type of feature-based attention, attention is shifted
within a perceptual quality space. The color quality space is rel-
atively simple. Psychophysical investigation of color vision has
shown that mental color qualities can be arranged in a three
dimensional space (for example the Munsell color solid) in which
the dimensions represent hue, saturation, and lightness (Hardin,
1988). Unfortunately, the situation is much more complex for the
odor quality space. Our current understanding of odors and their
perception does not allow us to order smells in a quality space
similar to the color space. It is possible that the odor space has a
complex structure and that multidimensional scaling techniques
will eventually discover an ordered multidimensional odor space
(Clark, 1993; Lycan, 2000). So far, those attempts have not come
close to describing an ordered space. They have, instead, conﬁrmed
Plato’s view that the most important dimension in odor quality
space is pleasantness (Khan et al., 2007). From the fact that no
odor quality space has been discovered yet, it can be concluded
that if it exists it has a very large number of dimension and a
complex structure.
Regardless of its exact structure there is empirical evidence that
olfactory attention can be selectively distributed over the odor
quality space. The reaction time to an odor for example has been
shown to be inﬂuenced by expectation.When subjects are looking
at a picture of oranges, the reaction time to orange odor is shorter
than when looking at a picture of ﬁshes (Gottfried and Dolan,
2003). These authors suggest that this and similar ﬁndings are best
interpreted as subjects directing their olfactory attention toward a
particular (orange-like) odor quality.
In contrast, experiments with odor mixtures have been inter-
preted as showing that features of an odor cannot be attended
to. In these experiments subjects were asked to identify the com-
ponents of odor mixtures. They were either instructed to report
if a single component (for example benzaldehyde) is present in
the mixture, or to report all the components (up to six out of
six different components) that they can identify in the mixture.
There was little difference in the ability to identify components
of mixtures between the two conditions (Laing and Glemarec,
1992). However, these results are not relevant for a discussion of
feature-based attention because the features of an odor over which
attention can operate are perceptual features and not types of mol-
ecules. Instead of showing the failure of attention toward features
in olfaction these results show that the perceptual features of an
odor mixture are not a combination of the perceptual features of
its components, a well-established fact (Jinks and Laing, 1999).
The results from mixture studies are therefore consistent with the
notion that attention can be directed to a speciﬁc area of the odor
quality space in analogy to feature-based visual attention.
ATTENTION TO OLFACTION
Theﬁfth type of attention in the taxonomyproposed byChun et al.
(2011) is different from the types discussed so far. In the types of
attention discussed so far attention is shifted through space, time,
or a quality space within a single modality. In attention toward a
modality attention is shifted between modalities. Of these inter-
modal attentional shifts the shift between audition and vision has
been studied in detail (Spence and Driver, 1997). Because of the
potential applications in the management of chronic pain, the
shifts of attention to and from nociceptive stimuli are also well
understood (Eccleston, 1995).
Several psychophysical studies have shown that attention can
be shifted toward olfaction in the same way it is shifted toward
the other modalities. It has been shown that attention to odors
decreases the response time to odors (Spence et al., 2000, 2001a,b).
In one study, Spence et al. (2001b) instructed subjects to discrimi-
nate either between two different intensities of an odor or between
two different light intensities emitted by a diode. The odor was
presented through a tube in the subject’s nose. There was a con-
tinuous ﬂow of odorless air through the tube and when an odor
had to be presented, a computerized valve opened, thereby mixing
the odorless air with the odor. An auditory cue primed the subjects
to attend to either the light (low-pitched tone) or the odor (high-
pitched tone). The cue was valid in most – but not all – cases.
Subjects had a shorter response time to the odor when the cue
was valid because they were attending to olfaction rather than to
vision.
In addition to these behavioral effects of attending to olfactory
information physiological effects of attending to smells have been
described. Olfactory event-related brain potentials show atten-
tional modulation (Pause et al., 1997; Krauel et al., 1998; Geisler
and Murphy, 2000; Masago et al., 2001) and more recently atten-
tion to odors has been shown to alter both behavioral responses to
odors and patterns of brain activity in response to odors in func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments (Sabri
et al., 2005; Zelano et al., 2005; Plailly et al., 2008). Together these
data show that it is possible to attend to olfaction in much the
same way in which we may attend to vision or audition.
TYPES OF ATTENTION FOUND IN OLFACTION
In this section I have developed a taxonomy of olfactory attention
that is modeled on a recent general taxonomy of attention (Chun
et al., 2011). I have used types of visual attention as reference
points. This direct comparison shows that many types of visual
attention are modality-speciﬁc adaptations to modality-speciﬁc
information processing requirements. Each modality is adapted
to provide us with speciﬁc information about our environment.
Some systems are specialized for processing spatial information
(like vision and passive touch) and in them a special mechanism
for spatial attention has evolved. Temporal attention and feature-
based attention are the two types of intramodal attentional shift
that are found in both vision and olfaction. Temporal attention
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is probably a universal type of attention. As long as attention can
be allocated, it can be allocated in time. Feature-based attention
is also found both in vision and in olfaction. However, this does
not mean that feature-based attention is not modality-speciﬁc. It
seems that for example in proprioception there are no features that
can be attended to. Like the other types of intramodal attention,
feature-based attention is an adaptation to speciﬁc functions of
some sense organs.
It is often overlooked that modality-speciﬁc attentional mech-
anisms are adaptations to sense organs and not adaptations to
stimulus types. Facts about the temporal and spatial structure of
human olfactory experiences are contingent on how we evolved
to sense odors. Insects smell with their antennae which are con-
tinuously exposed to the ever-changing odorous ambient air. If
we would have evolved olfactory sensors on the tip of our nose,
then our olfactory experiences would be uninterrupted by snifﬁng
and smelling would be much more like hearing. Similarly, some
single-celled organisms are entirely covered with chemoreceptors.
If we would be covered in odorant receptors over our entire body
surface, smelling would be much more like passive touch and we
would have evolved the mechanisms for covert spatial olfactory
attention.Without turning our head we could shift attention from
what we are smelling on our knee to what we are smelling on
our neck. The attentional mechanisms in the different modalities
have co-evolved with the sensory structures themselves and are
independent of the physical nature of the stimuli.
In contrast to intramodal attentional shifts, intermodal shifts of
attention like the shift of attention toward the olfactory modality
are not adaptations to a certain way of information gathering and
processing. These shifts are attentional shifts between information
that is processed in different ways in different areas of the brain.
They are similar to shifts from external to internal attention and
to shifts within internal attention, for example from memories to
task rules. I will in the next section introduce the shift of attention
from other modalities (or internal attention) toward the olfactory
modality as a system for the study of the relation between atten-
tion and consciousness. Because this type of attention is found in
all modalities (and in internal attention), my hope is that results
from this system will generalize over a wide range of systems in
which attention and consciousness interact.
NEURAL CORRELATES OF OLFACTORY ATTENTION AND
CONSCIOUSNESS
The anatomical structure underlying the processing of olfactory
information is simple and radically different from the one found in
the other sensory modalities (Figure 1). It has been suggested that
the olfactory system represents the “minimal neuroanatomy for
a conscious brain” (Morsella et al., 2010). The simplicity of this
system may help reveal the mechanisms underlying attentional
selection and conscious processing.
Odors are sensed by olfactory sensory neurons in the nose.
These neurons project to a layered structure in the forebrain called
“olfactory bulb”(Shepherd et al., 2004). Themain connection from
the olfactory bulb to higher brain centers is to the piriform cor-
tex (which is sometimes also called the “olfactory cortex” or the
“primary olfactory cortex”; Bower, 1991). Unlike the visual cortex,
auditory cortex, or somatosensory cortex, the piriform cortex is
FIGURE 1 | A simplified overview over brain centers involved in the
processing of olfactory information and their connectivity.The
anatomically most prominent and best understood pathway is from the
olfactory sensory neurons to the olfactory bulb and from there to the
piriform cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex.
not a neocortical but a paleocortical structure. The paleocortex is
phylogenetically older than the neocortex (hence the names) and
it consists of three rather than six layers but the cellular architec-
ture is similar. The piriform cortex is the main target for neurons
from the olfactory bulb but it is not their only target. They also
project to other paleocortical structures like the olfactory tubercle
and the entorhinal cortex as well as to the amygdala. I will here
only discuss the piriform cortex.
From the piriform cortex the main pathway is directly to the
orbitofrontal cortex, which is the neocortical structure in which
odor information is processed (Zald and Rauch, 2008). There is
also a much less prominent indirect pathway from the piriform
cortex to the orbitofrontal cortex via the mediodorsal thalamic
nucleus. There are also projections to other brain regions from the
piriform cortex, but they are not important for the discussion of
neural correlates of attention and consciousness in olfaction.
There are two prominent anatomical differences between the
olfactory systemand the other sensory systems in the humanbrain.
First, unlike other sensory information the majority of olfactory
information never passes through the thalamus. Second, olfac-
tory information is ﬁrst processed in the paleocortex (speciﬁcally
in the piriform cortex) and then in the neocortex (speciﬁcally in
the orbitofrontal cortex). Sensory information from most other
modalities is processed only in the neocortex. Two questions arise
from these anatomical peculiarities of the olfactory system. (1)
What is the functional olfactory analog of the thalamus which
is responsible for attentional selection in the other modalities?
(2) Is the piriform cortex or the orbitofrontal cortex the func-
tional olfactory analog of the sensory cortices that are responsible
for conscious information processing in the other modalities? I
will now discuss the two questions and then present a model of
attention and consciousness in olfaction based on the answers.
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ATTENTIONAL SELECTION IN OLFACTION
The attentional selection in visual spatial attention is believed
to occur in the thalamus (Crick, 1984; Mcalonan et al., 2008;
Geraint, 2009). Furthermore, shifts of attention between modal-
ities are also believed to require the thalamus (Newman, 1995;
Smythies, 1997) through thalamic sensory gating (Mccormick
and Bal, 1994). However, the majority of olfactory information
bypasses the thalamus on its way to the neocortex. This poses the
question of which brain structure performs the function of the
thalamus in the olfactory system. It has been suggested that atten-
tional selection in olfaction occurs in the olfactory bulb or in the
piriform cortex. A third proposal is that the minor indirect path-
way that connects the nose to the neocortex via the thalamus is
involved in olfactory attention. I will review the evidence for these
three proposals.
Attentional selection in the olfactory bulb
The olfactory bulb is an outgrowth of the forebrain in which the
axons of the olfactory sensory neurons terminate (Shepherd et al.,
2004). At this ﬁrst level of processing of olfactory information
“molecular features” of odor molecules are encoded, a function
that is reminiscent of the encoding of simple features of visual
objects in the primary visual cortex (Haberly, 2001). It has also
been pointed out that lateral inhibition is found both in the olfac-
tory bulb and in the retina and that these two structures may play
similar roles in vision and olfaction, respectively (Devriesa and
Baylora, 1993; Nakanishi, 1995; Ghatpande, 2008). Recently it has
been proposed that both of these comparisons are valuable and
that “the bulb is directly comparable not only to the retina but also
to primary visual cortex” (Cleland, 2010).
The motivation to suggest that the olfactory bulb in addition
performs the function of the thalamus comes from electrophysio-
logical recordings from neurons in the olfactory bulb of behaving
rats. It has been shown that when rats attend to olfaction, neurons
in the olfactory bulb ﬁre in tonic mode (as opposed to bursts of
spikes when olfaction is not attended to; Kay and Laurent, 1999).
This shift between burst and tonic mode depending on atten-
tional state is reminiscent of a similar shift in the thalamus that is
associated with attentional processes (Sherman, 2001). There are
also broad structural similarities between the thalamus and the
olfactory bulb. Most notably, there are excitatory feedback neu-
rons which can produce oscillating patterns of neuronal activity
in both systems (Kay and Sherman, 2007).
Attentional selection in the piriform cortex
From the olfactory bulb, neurons project to the piriform cor-
tex. In analogy to the visual system, it has been suggested that
in the piriform cortex the “molecular features” that are processed
in the olfactory bulb are combined to form “olfactory objects”
(Bower, 1991). The piriform cortex is also the last processing
stage for most olfactory information before the neocortex. In all
other sensory systems the last processing stage before the neo-
cortex is the thalamus and because of this analogy it has been
long speculated that the piriform cortex is an“olfactory thalamus”
(Lorente De No, 1938). Support for this model comes from elec-
trophysiological recordings in rats that showed that there are state-
dependent changes in odorant-evoked responses in a majority of
piriform cortex neurons, but not in neurons in the olfactory bulb
(Murakami et al., 2005). The apparent discrepancy between this
study and the study by Kay and Laurent (1999) may be due to the
fact that in this study the states on which the neuronal changes
depended were deﬁned by neocortical electroencephalograms (in
anesthetized animals), whereas in the study by Kay and Laurent
(1999) they were deﬁned behaviorally (in behaving animals).
Two fMRI studies of subjects attending to odors have uncov-
ered attentional modulation in the piriform cortex (Zelano et al.,
2005; Veldhuizen and Small, 2011). Two other studies did not
show attentional modulation of piriform cortex activity (Sabri
et al., 2005; Plailly et al., 2008). The four studies used different
methodology, stimuli, and thresholds for statistical signiﬁcance
and the different results may reﬂect these differences. The effects
of piriform cortex lesions can be studied in epilepsy patients
who underwent temporal lobectomy (for references, see Gottfried,
2010). These procedures are performed unilaterally. In one study
in which patients’ olfactory performance was tested before and
after the procedure, left-resected patients did show no effect of the
procedure on olfactory perception whereas right-resected patients
showed some decline. The ability to attend to the olfactorymodal-
ity has to my knowledge not been tested in subjects with piriform
cortex lesions.
Attentional selection in the thalamus
The piriform cortex is for most olfactory information the last
processing stage before the neocortex. However, in addition to the
main direct pathway between piriform cortex and neocortex, there
is also a minor indirect pathway via the mediodorsal thalamus
(Carmichael et al., 1994). This indirect pathway has been demon-
strated anatomically and electrophysiologically in rats (Price and
Slotnick, 1983; Price, 1985), rabbits (Benjamin et al., 1978), and
monkeys (Yarita et al., 1980; Takagia, 1986). At least in rats it is very
sparse (Price, 1985; Price et al., 1991). The existence of this indirect
pathway suggests the attractive possibility that attentional selec-
tion of all sensory information including olfactory information
occurs in the thalamus.
Consistent with this idea it was shown in an elegant study that
attention to the olfactory modality strengthened the connectiv-
ity between the mediodorsal thalamic nucleus and the neocortex
(speciﬁcally the orbitofrontal cortex), suggesting that a thala-
mic relay for olfactory information is activated by attending to
olfaction (Plailly et al., 2008). Traditional fMRI studies do not
measure the connectivity between different brain areas but merely
the response magnitude in different parts of the brain. Out of
three traditional fMRI studies of attention to olfaction only one
identiﬁed the thalamus as a structure that is involved in atten-
tion toward olfaction (Veldhuizen and Small, 2011). Instead, these
studies found attentional modulation in the orbitofrontal cor-
tex (Sabri et al., 2005; Veldhuizen and Small, 2011), the olfactory
tubercle (Zelano et al., 2005), the cerebellum (Zelano et al., 2005;
Veldhuizen and Small, 2011) as well as in several other structures
(Veldhuizen and Small, 2011).
The results of studies of olfactory defects inpatientswith lesions
in the mediodorsal thalamus (Potter and Butters, 1980; Rousseaux
et al., 1996; Asai et al., 2008; Sela et al., 2009; Tham et al., 2011a,b)
have been interpreted as showing that it is “likely” that patients
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with mediodorsal thalamic nucleus lesions have an impairment in
olfactory attention (Tham et al., 2011a). However, the ﬁndings in
these patients are not consistent with the idea that in the absence of
the indirect pathway from the piriform cortex to the orbitofrontal
cortex via themediodorsal thalamus the olfactorymodality cannot
be attended to.
A further problem for any model that assigns the mediodorsal
thalamus a role in attending to olfaction is that the indirect con-
nection between the piriform cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex
via the thalamus has not been found (tomy knowledge) in humans
yet. Even if large scale neuroanatomyprojects like theHumanCon-
nectome Project (Wig et al., 2011) will show that this connection
exists in humans, it is unclear howmuch information can be trans-
ferred through such a sparse connection. Discussing the indirect
pathway in the rat brain, Price et al. (1991) remarked that it is
“not well equipped to convey detailed sensory information to the
thalamus for relay to the neocortex.”
In summary, it is not plausible that the indirect thalamic path-
way is responsible for shifts of attention toward the olfactory
modality. The weak effects of thalamic lesions suggest a more
subtle role of the thalamus in olfaction. If not in the thalamus,
attentional selection has been speculated to occur in the olfactory
bulb or the piriform cortex. The evidence for attentional selec-
tion in the piriform cortex is more convincing although a study of
olfactory attention in patients with lesions of the piriform cortex
would help strengthen the evidence considerably.
The thalamus plays a role both in intramodal attentional shifts
in vision (Crick, 1984; Mcalonan et al., 2008; Geraint, 2009) and
in intermodal shifts for example between vision and audition
(Newman, 1995; Smythies, 1997). According to the view presented
here, in olfaction the piriform cortex plays the role of the thala-
mus in intramodal attentional shifts between, for example, fruity
and ﬂowery odors. Furthermore, the piriform cortex is also nec-
essary for shifts to and from olfaction. Accordingly, the role of
the thalamus in attentional shifts is not universal but modality-
speciﬁc. Attention can be shifted from memories to task rules,
from thoughts to olfaction, from vision to audition, or from olfac-
tion to vision. Different brain structures are involved in these
different types of attentional shifts. There has to be a connec-
tion between the different structures to coordinate their activity.
Maybe the few ﬁbers that connect the piriform cortex with the
thalamus (Carmichael et al., 1994) do not relay information about
the olfactory stimulus to the thalamus but are involved in the
coordination of attentional shifts between olfaction and the other
sensory modalities.
NEURAL CORRELATES OF CONSCIOUS OLFACTORY PROCESSING
According to computational theories of consciousness being con-
scious is a property of certain types of information processing
(Cleeremans, 2005). Structures in the brain in which information
is processed consciously have been called the neural correlates of
consciousness (Metzinger, 2000; Tononi and Koch, 2008). Some-
where in the brain olfactory information is processed consciously
and the structure in which this computation happens is the neural
correlate of olfactory consciousness. Since there are several con-
cepts of consciousness, there can be several neural correlates of
olfactory consciousness. I will discuss here the phenomenal neural
correlate of consciousness (Block, 2005; Stevenson, 2009) which is
the structure in the brain in which information about the content
of olfactory experience is processed consciously.
Olfactory information is processed both in the paleocortical
piriform cortex and in the neocortical orbitofrontal cortex. The
contribution of these two cortical sites to conscious processing
of olfactory information is unclear (Shepherd, 2007). The pale-
ocortical piriform cortex is a three-layered cortex that is only a
single synapse away from the odor molecules. It is structurally
simpler and phylogenetically older than the six-layered neocortical
orbitofrontal cortex which is only found in mammals (Gottfried,
2007).
There are reasons to assume that the phenomenal neural
correlate of olfactory consciousness is found in the neocortical
orbitofrontal cortex. First, the neural correlates of visual con-
sciousness, which have been explored in some detail, are also
assumed to be found in neocortical structures and associated brain
regions (Crick and Koch, 2003). Second, a recent lesion study of
a single patient showed that brain injury that was largely limited
to the right orbitofrontal cortex did completely abolish conscious
processing of olfactory information. In contrast, the patient’s abil-
ity to modulate his snifﬁng behavior in response to olfactory
stimuli was unaffected and he showed normal skin conductance
responses to odors (Li et al., 2010). This study is consistent with
previous studies of patients with orbitofrontal damage or lesions
(see references in Li et al., 2010).
However, the most important question for locating the neural
correlate of phenomenally conscious olfactory experiences is what
the content of those experiences is and where the information
specifying these contents is processed. I will now ﬁrst describe the
phenomenal content of conscious olfactory experiences and then
review what type of information is processed in the piriform cor-
tex and in the orbitofrontal cortex. A comparison will show that
the neural correlate of olfactory consciousness is likely to be found
somewhere in the orbitofrontal cortex.
The content of olfactory consciousness
The content of olfactory consciousness is determined partially by
the physical features of the odor molecule. There are prominent
physical features that have a strong inﬂuence on the content of
olfactory consciousness. For example sulfur atoms in an odor
molecule result reliably in a characteristic sulfuric smell (Boelens
and van Gemert, 1993). However, the content of olfactory con-
sciousness is also strongly inﬂuenced by contextual factors. The
inﬂuence of contextual factors on the content of olfactory con-
sciousness means that, even in theory, complete knowledge of the
physical features of the odor molecule is not sufﬁcient to accu-
rately predict the content of the conscious olfactory experience. I
use “contextual factors” here as an umbrella term for remembered
associations with the odor, internal states (hunger, sadness, etc.),
and sensory input from other modalities. I will now discuss the
inﬂuence of each of these types of context.
Associations with the odor that were established during a pre-
vious encounter can change how the odor is experienced. Tequila
smells different before and after tequila-induced alcohol poison-
ing. In the laboratory, changes like this have been demonstrated
in a series of experiments that investigated how odors can acquire
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the odor quality “sweet” through association. Several experiments
(reviewed in Stevenson and Boakes, 2003) have shown that when
odors are repeatedly paired with sugar, they acquire the odor qual-
ity “sweet” and are subsequently described as sweet smelling when
they are experienced in the absence of sugar.
The inﬂuence of internal states on the content of olfactory con-
sciousness is seen in the satiety dependent difference in how the
same odor stimulus is perceived at different times. It has been
suggested that the smell of a “grilled 40-oz. dry-aged porterhouse
steak” is experienced differently after one has just consumed such a
steak than before (Gottfried, 2007). Similarly, Yeshurun and Sobel
(2010) write that “banana odor when you are hungry is a different
object from banana odor when you are satiated.”
Themost dramatic example of information from other sensory
modalities that modulates olfactory experiences is the perception
of ﬂavor. Flavor is a combination of olfactory, gustatory, tac-
tile, and other sensations. The olfactory component in ﬂavor is
not experienced as a distinct experience but as part of a ﬂavor
experience.
These examples demonstrate the strong contribution of con-
textual factors to the content of olfactory conscious experience.
This is not a novel proposal. Others have defended similar posi-
tions in much more detail. Gottfried and Wu (2009) called this
effect the “perceptual pliability of odor objects,”whereas Yeshurun
and Sobel (2010) called odor a “sensory emotion.” Stevenson and
Boakes (2003), who focused on the effect of memories and associ-
ation on odor experiences, proposed “a mnemonic theory of odor
perception.”
What information is processed in the piriform cortex and in the
orbitofrontal cortex
If both the physical features of the odor molecules and the con-
text contribute to the content of conscious olfactory experience
then the neural correlate of consciousness must be located in a
structure that processes both information about the stimulus and
information about the context. The two candidate structures for
the neural correlate of consciousness are the piriform cortex and
the orbitofrontal cortex and I will now discuss to what extent
information about context is processed in these two structures.
Information processing in the piriform cortex (Bower, 1991;
Neville andHaberly, 2004) and the orbitofrontal cortex (Gottfried
and Zald, 2005; Zald and Rauch, 2008) has been comprehensively
reviewed elsewhere. I will focus here on studies in which olfactory
stimuli are presented in different contexts to identify brain struc-
tures in which activity is inﬂuenced both by the stimulus and by
the context. fMRI studies allow to directly compare activity in the
piriform cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex under these condi-
tions. Several such studies have been performed and the results
show clearly that context is processed mainly or exclusively in
the orbitofrontal cortex. Remembered associations with the odor,
internal states, and sensory input from other modalities have all
been investigated.
Changes of perceived odor quality through remembered asso-
ciations have been studied in most detail psychophysically for the
acquisition of a “sweet” odor quality by odors that are paired
with sugars (reviewed in Stevenson and Boakes, 2003). To my
knowledge it has not been investigated in which brain regions the
representation of odors changes when they acquire the “sweet”
odor quality. However, it has been shown that orbitofrontal
cortex activity depends on how likely it is that a given odor–
taste combination has been experienced previously. There is
a superadditive response in the orbitofrontal cortex to pairs
that have presumably been experienced together before (vanilla-
sugar), but not to pairs that presumably have not been experi-
enced before (vanilla-salt; Small et al., 2004). Another study has
investigated the processes of pairing an odor with an electric
shock (Li et al., 2008). Pairing an odor with an electric shock
changes the odor representation in both the piriform and the
orbitofrontal cortex. However, the changes in the piriform cor-
tex are qualitative whereas the changes in the orbitofrontal cortex
are quantitative.
Among internal states, the inﬂuence of satiety on olfactory
information processing has been studied extensively. It has been
shown that odor representation in the orbitofrontal cortex (but
not in the piriform cortex) is satiety dependent (O’Doherty et al.,
2000). The odor of banana in these experiments has been shown to
be represented differently in the orbitofrontal cortex after subjects
ate banana to satiety. The representation of the odor of unrelated
food did not change.
Odor representations in the orbitofrontal cortex also change
when odors are paired with stimuli in other modalities. Neural
activation in the orbitofrontal cortex was increased, for example,
when an odor was presented in the expected visual context, for
example when a rose odor was combined with the picture of a rose
compared to the same odor combinedwith a picture of a bus (Got-
tfried and Dolan, 2003). This effect is not limited to pictures but
extends to visually perceived verbal labels (De Araujo et al., 2005).
The same odor (isovaleric acid) elicited different orbitofrontal cor-
tex responses when labeled “cheddar cheese” than when labeled
“body odor.” In this study the results for the piriform cortex were
ambiguous and the authors state that there “may” be modulation
of the piriform cortex response. In addition to visual stimuli, gus-
tatory stimuli can also inﬂuence the odor representation in the
orbitofrontal cortex (De Araujo et al., 2003).
Taken together these results show that much of the informa-
tion about context that contributes to the content of olfactory
consciousness is processed in the orbitofrontal cortex but not in
the piriform cortex. Although it is clear from the results of some
of the studies in humans that were discussed above as well as
from electrophysiological recordings in rodents (Wilson, 2010;
Doucette et al., 2011) that some types of context can inﬂuence
processing in the piriform cortex, the most prominent function
of the piriform cortex is to process information about physical
features of odor molecules. In contrast, the most prominent func-
tion of the orbitofrontal cortex is to integrate information about
physical features of the stimulus with information about the con-
text. The information processed in the orbitofrontal cortex is the
information that determines the content of conscious olfactory
experiences.
NEURAL CORRELATES OF OLFACTORY ATTENTION AND
CONSCIOUSNESS
In this section I introduced three candidate structures for atten-
tional selection and two candidate structures for conscious
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FIGURE 2 |The connectivity of brain centers involved in the processing
of olfactory information and sites that have been proposed to be the
neural correlates of attentional selection and conscious processing.
Three potential sites of attentional selection and two potential sites of
conscious processing can be combined to six models (A–F). Conscious
processing of olfactory information could occur in the orbitofrontal cortex
with attentional selection occurring prior to conscious processing either in
the piriform cortex (A), or the olfactory bulb (B), or the mediodorsal nucleus
of the thalamus (C). Alternatively, conscious processing could occur in the
piriform cortex with attentional selection occurring in the same structure (D),
or prior to conscious processing in the olfactory bulb (E), or after conscious
processing in the mediodorsal nucleus of the thalamus.
processing in the olfactory system. These structures could be
combined to six models of olfactory information processing
(Figure 2). In four of these models attentional selection occurs
prior to conscious processing. In one model attentional selection
operates over consciously processed information (Figure 2F) and
in another model both attention and conscious processing are
accomplished by the piriform cortex (Figure 2D). To my knowl-
edge, only three of these models have been suggested. It has been
proposed that that attentional selection occurs in the olfactory
bulb and conscious processing in the piriform cortex (Figure 2E;
Kay and Sherman, 2007). Alternatively, it has been suggested that,
like in other sensory modalities, attentional selection occurs in the
thalamus and conscious processing in theneocortical orbitofrontal
cortex (Figure 2C; Plailly et al., 2008). The data I reviewed here
supports the third model which proposes that the piriform cortex
performs attentional selection and the orbitofrontal cortex con-
scious processing of olfactory information (Murakami et al., 2005;
Figure 2A).
IS ATTENTION TOWARD THE OLFACTORY MODALITY
NECESSARY FOR OLFACTORY CONSCIOUSNESS?
Identifying the neural structures underlying attention and con-
sciousness is an important step for the conceptual analysis of the
relation between the two processes. Many questions can be and
have been asked about the relation of attention to consciousness. Is
attention the same as consciousness (Posner, 1994; Lamme, 2003)?
Is attention necessary and/or sufﬁcient for consciousness (Prinz,
2010; Van Boxtel et al., 2010)? Or is it the other way around and
consciousness is necessary and/or sufﬁcient for attention (Mole,
2008)? Is information ﬁrst consciously processed and then atten-
tion acts on it or does attention act on information before it is
consciously processed (Lamme, 2003)? All these are fundamental
conceptual questions that remain unanswered. I will focus here on
the question about the necessity of attention for consciousness.
The question if attention is necessary for consciousness has
been investigatedpreviously in some types of visual attentionusing
a variety of paradigms. Inattentional blindness (Mack and Rock,
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1998), attentional blink (Raymond et al., 1992), change blind-
ness (Simons and Rensink, 2005), and load induced blindness
(Macdonald and Lavie, 2008) are striking phenomena in visual
perception in which stimuli that are consciously processed when
attended to are not consciously processed when not attended to.
On the other hand, there are other phenomena inwhich stimuli are
consciously processed in the absence of attention (see Van Boxtel
et al., 2010 and references therein). A (possibly insurmountable)
weakness of these experiments is that it is currently not possible
to achieve and demonstrate complete absence of all attention to an
area of the visual ﬁeld (De Brigard and Prinz, 2010).
I will now attempt to answer the question about the necessity
of attention for consciousness for the olfactory modality. I will
present two types of evidence, observational and experimental,
that attention is necessary for conscious processing of olfactory
information and then address the main objection to this claim.
Based on the evidence, I will argue that attention to smells is
necessary for consciousness of smells.
OBSERVATIONAL EVIDENCE THAT ATTENTION IS NECESSARY FOR
OLFACTORY CONSCIOUSNESS
Olfaction researchers often seem to presuppose that attention is
necessary for olfactory consciousness. Sela and Sobel (2010) for
examplewrite that“olfactory stimuli are less prone to attract atten-
tion, and therefore humans have poor awareness to the olfactory
environment.” Similarly, Plailly et al. (2008) conclude from their
ﬁnding that the thalamic relay is involved in directing attention
to smells that olfaction requires a thalamic relay for the conscious
processing of smells, a conclusion that presupposes that directing
attention to smells is necessary to consciously process them
The assumption that attention to olfaction is necessary for
consciousness of olfaction is consistent with most normal, every-
day olfactory experiences. With almost every breath we inhale
air containing odors at relatively high concentrations; yet olfac-
tory experiences are very rare (compared, for example, with visual
experiences). This shows that there is an additional cognitive fac-
tor necessary to turn the presence of an olfactory stimulus into
conscious olfactory experience. Because attending to the olfactory
modality almost always results in a conscious olfactory experience,
it seems plausible that this cognitive factor is attention.
The importance of the role of attention for olfactory experi-
ences is further illustrated by the fact that people are very often
wrong in their judgments about changes in their own olfactory
abilities or in the odorous environment. The natural assumption,
when a person’s conscious olfactory experiences change systemati-
cally is that either the stimuli or the sensory apparatus has changed.
However, in numerous well studied situations this is not the case.
Instead, the change in conscious olfactory experience is entirely
causedby a change in attention to the olfactorymodality. Increased
consciousness of smells due to increased attention to smells is seen
during pregnancy, but also in people in which the cause for the
change is not known.
The vast majority of pregnant women report that their olfac-
tory sensitivity is enhanced during pregnancy. Studies have shown
that this is not the case. The olfactory acuity is not changed during
pregnancy (Cameron, 2007; Doty and Cameron, 2009). Instead
the systematic differences in conscious olfactory experiences are
caused by attentional factors. The involuntary increase in attention
to odors during pregnancy is probably an adaptive response to the
fact that the fetus is especially volatile to environmental poisons
and spoiled food. These attentional changes result in a radically
altered olfactory conscious experience.
In the case of heightened odor awareness during pregnancy
the cause for the attentional shift toward olfaction is known, but
there are also vast differences in the attention to olfaction among
non-pregnant individuals. Psychophysically measured olfactory
abilities, in the general population, do not correlate with how
annoyed subjects are by environmental odors or with how the
subjects rate their own olfactory abilities. How annoyed they are
by odors and how they rate their abilities however does correlate
(Knaapila et al., 2008). This shows that people attribute changes in
their conscious olfactory experience that are caused by attentional
processes to changes in their olfactory abilities. In extreme cases,
heightened attention to the olfactorymodality can cause debilitat-
ing conditions that are part of a heterogeneous groupof conditions
called“multiple chemical sensitivity”or“idiopathic environmental
intolerances” (Dalton and Hummel, 2000).
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE THAT ATTENTION IS NECESSARY FOR
OLFACTORY CONSCIOUSNESS
These observations about the fundamental role of attention in
olfactory consciousness suggest that attention is necessary for con-
sciousness in olfaction. Unfortunately, there is no empirical study
directly addressing the question of necessity that could support
this conclusion. All studies of the role of attention in olfactory
consciousness present the stimulus through a plastic tube that is
inserted into the subject’s nostril. It can be assumed that under
this condition subjects will always attend to some degree to the
olfactory modality, regardless of the experimenter’s instructions.
This experimental setup is therefore not suitable to study olfactory
consciousness in the absence of attention to olfaction.
Alternative experimental setups make it possible to reduce the
subjects’ attention to the olfactory modality further. The most
covert way to deliver an odor stimulus is to add it to the ambient
air that the subject is breathing. Such experiments have revealed
a stunning failure of subjects to become conscious of unattended
smells (Lorig, 1992; Degel and Koester, 1999). In one study (Lorig,
1992), in which the inﬂuence of odors on the appeal of pictures
was studied, only 3 out of the 93 subjects became aware of the odor
manipulations whereas several other subjects reported a perceived
(although non-existent) change in luminance.
Studies like this demonstrate dramatically the absence of olfac-
tory consciousness in the absence of attention. However, what
would be needed to test the necessity of attention for odor con-
sciousness would be a study that determines the detection thresh-
old for ambient odor in a situation in which subjects are engaged
in some non-olfactory task and have no indication that odors
are part of the experiment. This could then be compared to the
detection threshold for ambient odor when subjects are told to
attend to ambient odors. My prediction is that such an experi-
mentwould reveal a very strong inﬂuence of attention on olfactory
consciousness. However, I also predict that at very high odor con-
centrations subjects would consciously perceive the odor even
under minimal attention conditions. This would be an appar-
ent counterexample to the claim that attention is necessary for
olfactory consciousness.
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THE STRONG STIMULUS OBJECTION AGAINST THE NECESSITY OF
ATTENTION FOR OLFACTORY CONSCIOUSNESS
Examples of apparent olfactory consciousness in the absence of
attention to olfaction can also be found in every-day experiences.
Ethylmercaptan,which is added as a warning agent to propane gas
to alert us to gas leaks, for example, is often perceived by people
whodonot attend to smells at all. It has to be added at 57,000-times
the concentration atwhich it is detectedwhen it is attended to (Sela
andSobel,2010),but a case of conscious detection in the absence of
attentionwould refute the claim that attention is necessary regard-
less of the stimulus intensity. This objection is not limited to the
cases of attention in the olfactory system. In the visual system the
phenomenon of change blindness seems to show that attention
is necessary for conscious perception. However, when the change
that is introduced outside the attended area is a large red trian-
gle in a black and white image, then the change will be processed
consciously although it occurred in an unattended area.
A usual response to this objection is to distinguish between
top-down attention, which is a cognitive process, and bottom-up
attention, which is a feature of the stimulus. I prefer to not call
anything “attention” that is not a cognitive process and therefore
do reject this response. Instead, I have two responses to the strong
stimulus objection. The ﬁrst is that it is possible that attention to
olfaction is never completely absent and that the minimum atten-
tion that could possibly be allocated to the olfactory modality is
sufﬁcient for conscious processing of ethyl mercaptan at 57,000-
times the concentration at which it is consciously processed when
attended to. The second response is that not everything that is
attributed to the sense of smell is actually mediated by the sense
of smell. There is a second sensory system that senses volatile
chemicals in our nose.
Although it has not been demonstrated experimentally, it is
plausible that the extent towhich attention is allocated to the olfac-
tory modality allows of degrees. “Attended to” and “not attended
to”are most likely idealized extreme cases of a continuous process.
If this is the case then subjects would perform best at tasks requir-
ing conscious processing of olfactory informationwhen instructed
to attend to olfaction. The performance would drop in the resting
state and further drop when they are instructed to attend to the
visual modality. If they perform a complex visual task for which
they are highly motivated, the olfactory performance would drop
even further.
If it is true that attention to olfaction allows for degrees then
the question is over which range attention to olfaction can be
modulated and if it is ever completely absent. A case in which
one may expect attention to olfaction to be minimal is sleep. And
indeed, odor stimuli at very high concentration, unlike stimuli in
other modalities, fail to awake sleeping subjects (Carskadon and
Herz, 2004). This is consistent with the notion that attention is
necessary for consciousness of smells. The apparent counterexam-
ples are cases in which minimal attention is allocated to olfaction.
Because of the intensity of the stimulus and the long time the stim-
ulus is present this minimal attention is sufﬁcient for conscious
processing.
The second response to the strong stimulus objection is to
point out that experience is not a good guide to judge if there are
smells that are consciously processed in the absence of attention to
olfaction because what is experienced as a “smell” is a multimodal
sensory experience, only partially mediated by the olfactory sys-
tem. It may be surprising, for example, that smells can’t wake
sleeping subjects (Carskadon and Herz, 2004). Sleepers often get
woken up by the smell of smoke and “smelling salts” have brought
countless fainted women in Victorian England and knocked-out
boxers back to consciousness. However, neither smoke nor the
ammonia gas released by smelling salts is perceived by the olfac-
tory system. Instead, these and many other stimuli are perceived
by nerve endings of the trigeminal nerve in the nasal cavity (Doty,
1995). The trigeminal nerve is a warning system that evolved to
prevent us from inhalingdangerous substances.As such, it is always
attended to and if the stimuli are strong enough to activate it (it
is much less sensitive than the olfactory system), the information
will be consciously processed. Because both the olfactory system
and the trigeminal nerve detect stimuli inside the nasal cavity,
the perceptions mediated by them are often collectively referred
to as “smelling.” However, unlike olfactory information, trigemi-
nal information is not processed in the paleocortex and instead,
like all sensory non-olfactory information, is relayed through the
thalamus to the neocortex (Huart et al., 2009). Apparent cases
of “smells” being perceived without being attended to are likely
to be mediated by this warning system and not by the olfactory
system.
In summary, the fact that very strong olfactory stimuli are often
consciously processed by subjects who are not attending to olfac-
tion seems to show that attention is not necessary for olfactory
consciousness. However, two things have to be considered. First,
it is unlikely that there are many situations in which subjects do
not attend to one of their ﬁve senses at all. And second, there is a
dedicated warning system to alert us to dangerous volatile chemi-
cals, the trigeminal nerve,whichmay be responsible formost of the
cases inwhich volatile chemicals are sensed in the absence of atten-
tion to olfaction. The strong stimulus objection is therefore no
reason to assume that attention is not necessary for consciousness
of smells.
CONCLUSION
My goal in this review was to introduce attention to the olfactory
modality as a simple system in which to study the relation between
consciousness and attention. Toward this goal I ﬁrst showed how
this system ﬁts into a general taxonomy of attention. I then dis-
cussed the neuroanatomy of the olfactory system to illustrate how
this system differs from the more complicated visual system. I also
demonstrated the utility of this model system by using it to weigh
in on the question of the necessity of attention for consciousness.
The visual system,despite being extremely specialized and com-
plicated, has become the de facto model system for perceptual
cognitive neuroscience. I hope that I succeeded here in showing
the potential of very simple and basic systems like olfaction for
revealing basic conceptual truths about entities like “attention”
and “consciousness.”
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